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HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR; 



A CHAPTER FROM ENGLISH HISTORY, 



BY 



CHARLES J. S.TILLE 




PHILADELPHIA: 
MARTIEN, PRINTER, 619 & 621 JAYNE STREET. 

1863. 






n'^*" 



"History, if it be not the merest toy, the idlest pastime of our vacant 
hours, is the record of the onward march of Humanity towards an end. 
Where there is no belief in such an end, and therefore no advance towards 
it, no stirrings of a Divine Word in a people's bosom, where not as yet the 
beast's heart has been taken away, and a man's heart given, there History 
cannot be said to be. They belong not, therefore, to History, least of all 
to sacred History, those Babels, those cities of confusion, those huge pens, 
into which by force and fraud, the early hunters of men, the Nimrods and 
the Sesostrises drave, and compelled their fellows: and Scripture is only 
most true to its idea while it passes them almost or wholly in silence 
by, while it lingers rather on the plains of Mamre with the man that 
"believed God and it was counted unto him for righteousness," than by 
"populous No" or great Babylon, where no faith existed but in the blind 
powers of nature, and the bi^ute forces of the natural man." 

Trench's Hulsean Lecture^ 

The Unity of Scripture. 



We have known hitherto in this country so little 
of the actual realities of war on a grand scale, that 
many are beginning to look upon the violent oppo- 
sition to the government, and the slowness of the 
progress of our arms, as signs of hopeless discourage- 
ment. History, however, shows us that these are the 
inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free peo- 
ple. This might be abundantly illustrated by many 
remarkable events in English history, from the days 
of the great Rebellion down through the campaigns 
of the Prince of Orange, and of Marlborough, to the 
wars which grew out of the events of the French 
Revolution. War is always entered upon amidst a 
vast deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly 
unreasoning. It is the universal voice of history, 
that such enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in sup- 
porting the prolonged and manifold burdens which 
are inseparable from every war waged on an exten- 
sive scale, and for a long period. The popular idea 
of war is a speedy and decisive victory, and an 



4 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

immediate occupation of the enemy's capital, fol- 
lowed by a treaty of peace by which the objects of 
the war are permanently secured. Nothing is 
revealed to the excited passions of the multitude, 
but dazzling visions of national glory, purchased by 
small privations, and the early and complete subju- 
gation of their enemies. It is, therefore, not unna- 
tural that at the first reverse they should yield at 
once to an unmanly depression, and, giving up all 
for lost, they should vent upon the government for 
its conduct of the war, and upon the army and its 
generals for their failure to make their dreams .of 
victory realities, an abuse as unreasoning as was 
their original enthusiasm. 

Experience has taught the English people that the 
progress of a war never fulfils the popular expecta- 
tions; that although victory may be assured at last 
to patient and untiring vigour and energy in its 
prosecution, yet during the continuance of a long 
war, there can be no well-founded hope of a uniform 
and constant series of brilliant triumphs in the field, 
illustrating the profound wisdom of the policy of 
the Cabinet; that, on the contrary, all war, even that 
which is most successful in the end, consists rather 
in checkered fortunes, of alternations of victory and 
disaster, and that its conduct is generally marked by 
what were evidently, when viewed in the light of 
experience, blunders so glaring in the policy adopted 
by the government, or in the strategy of its generals^ 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 5 

that the wonder is success was achieved at all. The 
English have thus been taught that the true charac- 
teristic of public opinion, in its judgment of a 
war, should be, not hopefulness nor impatience of 
immediate results, but rather a stern endurance — 
that King-quality of heroic constancy which, rooted 
deep in a profound conviction of the justice of the 
cause, supports a lofty public spirit equally well in 
the midst of temporary disaster, and in the hour of 
assured triumph. 

We have had no such experience here. Our 
people are perhaps more easily excited by success, 
and more readily depressed by reverses, than the 
English, and it is, therefore, worth while to consider 
how they carried on war on a grand scale and for a 
protracted period. It will be found, if we mistake 
not, that the denunciations of the government, so 
common among us of late, and the complaints of the 
inactivity of the army, have their exact counterpart 
in the history of the progress of all the wars in which 
England has been engaged since the days of the 
great Rebellion. He who draws consolation from 
the lessons of the past, will not, we think, seek com- 
fort in vain when he discovers that in all those wars 
in which the government and the army have been so 
bitterly assailed, (except that of the American Revo- 
lution,) England has at last been triumphant. It is 
worth while, then, to look into English history to 
understand how war is successfully carried on, not- 



6 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

withstanding the obstacles which, owing to a per- 
verted public opinion, exist within the nation itself. 
These difficulties, although they inhere in the very 
nature of a free government, often prove, as we shall 
see, more fruitful of embarrassment to the favourable 
prosecution of a war, than the active operations of 
the enemy. 

We propose to illustrate the propositions which 
we have advanced by a study of the series of cam- 
paigns known in English history as the Peninsular 
War. We select this particular war because we 
think that in many of its events, and in the policy 
which sustained it, there are to be observed many 
important, almost startling parallelisms with our 
present struggle. We have, of course, no reference 
to any similarity existing in the principle which 
produced the two wars, but rather to the striking 
resemblance in the modes adopted by the two people 
for prosecuting war on a grand scale, and for the vin- 
dication of a principle regarded as of vital impor- 
tance by them. 

The Peninsular War on the part of England, as 
was contended by the ministry during its progress, 
and as is now universally recognised, was a struggle 
not only to maintain her commercial supremacy, 
(which was then, as it is now, her life,) but also to 
protect her own soil from invasion by the French, 
by transferring the scene of conflict to distant Spain. 
The general purpose of assisting the alliance against 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 7 

Napoleon seems always to have been a subordinate 
motive. It is now admitted by all historians, that 
upon success in this war depended not only Eng- 
land's rank among nations, but her very existence 
as an independent people. The war was carried 
on for more than five years, and on a scale, so 
far as the number of men and the extent of 
the military operations are concerned, until then 
wholly unattempted by England in her European 
wars. The result, as it need not be said, was not 
only to crown the British arms with the most brilliant 
and undying lustre, but also to retain permanently in 
their places the party whose only title to public favour 
was that they had carried on the war against the most 
serious obstacles, and brought it to a successful ter- 
mination. Thus was delayed, it may be remarked, 
for at least twenty years, the adoption of those meas- 
ures of reform which at last gave to England that place 
in modern civilization which had long before been 
reached by most of the nations of the Continent by 
passing through the trials of a bloody revolution. If 
we, then, in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and 
despondency as to the final result, let us not forget 
the ordeal through which England successfully passed. 
We shall find that, in the commencement, there was 
the same wild and unreasoning enthusiasm with which 
we are familiar; the same bitter abuse and denuncia- 
tion of the government at the first reverses ; the same 
impatient and ignorant criticism of military opera- 



8 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

tions; the same factious and disloyal opposition on 
the part of a powerful party ; the same discourage- 
ment and despondency at times on the part of the 
true and loyal; the same prophecies of the utter 
hopelessness of success ; the same complaints of griev- 
ous and burdensome taxation, and predictions of the 
utter financial ruin of the country ; the same violent 
attacks upon the government for its arbitrary decrees, 
and particularly for the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus ; the same difficulties arising from the 
inexperience of the army; and the same weakness 
on the part of the government in not boldly and 
energetically supporting the army in the field. These 
are some of the more striking parallelisms between 
the Peninsular War and our own struggle, which a 
slight sketch of the progress of that war will render 
very apparent. 

The insurrection in Spain which followed immedi- 
ately upon a knowledge of the intrigues of Napoleon 
at Bayonne, in April 1807, by which the royal family 
was entrapped into an- abdication of its right to the 
throne, and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that 
country, roused universal admiration and enthusiasm 
in England. It was thought by all parties that an 
obstacle to the further progress of Napoleon's schemes 
of the most formidable character had at last been 
found. It was the first popular insurrection in any 
country against Napoleon's power, and consequently, 
when the deputies from the Asturias reached Eng- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 9 

land imploring succour, their appeals excited the 
popular feeling to the highest pitch, and the opposite 
parties in Parliament and the country vied with each 
other in demanding that England should aid the in- 
surrection with the whole of her military power. It 
is curious to observe, that when the question of aid 
was brought before Parliament, Mr. Canning and 
Mr. Sheridan, who had probably never acted toge- 
ther before on any political question, rivalled each 
other in their praise of the Spaniards, and in their 
expressions of hope and belief that Napoleon had at 
last taken a step which would speedily prove fatal to 
him. Large supplies were voted by acclamation, 
and an important expedition, afterwards operating 
in two columns, one under the command of Sir John 
Moore, the other under that of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
was dispatched to the Peninsula to aid the insur- 
gents. It is not our purpose to trace the progress of 
this expedition, but merely to notice the effect which 
its immediate results, the retreat to Corunna, and 
the Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular 
feeling in England. As we look back on the history 
of that time, the folly and madness which seized 
upon the popular mind when the terms of the Con- 
vention of Cintra became known, can only be ex- 
plained by recalling the high-wrought and extrava- 
gant expectations of immediate success with which 
the war had been entered upon. By this Conven- 
tion, and as the result of a single battle, Portugal 



10 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

was wholly evacuated by the French; yet such were 
the unreasonable demands of public opinion, that 
because the whole French army had not been made 
prisoners of war, the Ministry was almost swept 
away by the outburst, and it could only control the 
storm by removing the two generals highest in rank. 
It required all the family and political influence of 
the third, Sir Arthur Wellesley, to enable him to re- 
tain his position in the army. The disastrous re- 
treat of Sir John Moore's army to Corunna, and the 
easy triumphs of the French at that period through- 
out all Spain, plunged the English into despair. 
Going from one extreme to another, men who, only 
three months before, had quarrelled with the army 
in Portugal because it had not given them the spec- 
tacle of a French marshal and twenty thousand of his 
soldiers as prisoners of war at Spithead, now spoke 
openly of the folly of any attempt at all on the part 
of England to resist the progress of the French arms 
in the Peninsula. In Parliament there was the 
usual lame apology for disaster, an attempt to shift 
the responsibility from the Ministry to the General 
in command ; but the great fact, that all their hopes 
had been disappointed still remained, and after the 
explanations of the government the general despond- 
ency became more gloomy than ever. It is not dif- 
ficult in the light of history to see where the blame 
of failure should rest. Any one w^ho is disposed 
now to sneer and cavil at the shortcomings of our own 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 11 

administration, to impute to it views short-sighted 
and impracticable in their policy, and to blame it 
for want of energy and vigour in the prosecution of 
the war, has only to turn to Colonel Napier's account 
of the stupid blunders of the English government, its 
absurd and contradictory orders, its absolute ignorance 
not only of the elementary principles of all war, but 
of the very nature of the country in which the army 
was to operate, and of the resources of the enemy, to 
be convinced that had its mode of carrying on hos- 
tilities, (which was the popular one,) been adopted, in 
six months not an English soldier would have remained 
in the Peninsula except as a prisoner of war. The 
history of this campaign contains important lessons 
for us; it shows conclusively that the immediate re- 
sults of war are never equal to the public expecta- 
tion, and that if this public expectation, defeated by 
the imbecility of the government, or soured by disas- 
ter in the field, is to be the sole rule by which mili- 
tary operations are to be judged, no war for the de- 
fence of a principle can long be carried on. 

Fortunately for the fame and the power of Eng- 
land, the Ministry, although ignorant of the true 
mode of prosecuting hostilities, had sense enough to 
perceive that their only true policy was perseverance. 
They were strong enough to resist the formidable 
opposition which the events we have referred to de- 
veloped in Parliament and the country, and, undis- 
mayed by the experience of the past, concluded a 



12 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

treaty with the Provisional Government of Spain, by 
which they pledged England never to abandon the 
national cause until the French were driven across 
the Pyrenees. The army was placed upon a better 
footing, was largely reinforced, and Sir Arthur Wel- 
lesley was appointed to the chief command. The 
government, not yet wholly awakened from its illu- 
sions, still thought it practicable to reach Madrid in 
a single campaign, and to that end the efforts of 
Wellington were directed. It became necessary first 
to dislodge Soult at Oporto, and the magnificent 
victory of the English, gained by the passage of the 
Douro at that point, went far to revive confidence at 
home in the invincibility of their army. Yet so 
clear is it that victory in war often depends upon 
what, for some better name, we may call mere good 
fortune, that we have the authority of the Duke of 
Wellington himself for saying, that this army, which 
had just exhibited such prodigies of valour, Vv^as then 
in such a state of demoralization, that although "ex- 
cellent on parade, excellent to fight, it was worse 
than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution 
alike by success or defeat." Certainly no severer 
criticism has ever been justified by the inexperience 
and want of discipline of our own raw levies than 
that contained in this memorable declaration. A 
little reflection and candour might perhaps teach us, 
as it did the English, that nothing can compensate 
for the want of experience, and that every allowance 



CONDUCT A LONG T7AR. 



13 



is to be made for disasters where it is necessary to 
educate both officers and soldiers in the actual pre- 
sence of the enemy. Wellington soon afterwards 
moved towards the Spanish frontier, hoping by a 
junction with the army under Cuesta to fight a battle 
with the French which would open to him the road 
to the capital. The battle was fought at Talavera, 
and although it has since been claimed by the Eng- 
lish as one of their proudest victories, and the name 
of Talavera is now inscribed upon the standards of 
the regiments who took part in it with those of Sala- 
manca and Vittoria, yet the result was in^ the end, 
that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon just 
three months after he had set out from that place, 
having left his wounded in the hands of the French, 
having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly 
cut off in his retreat, and having lost one-third of 
his army in battle and by disease. Of course the 
blame w^as thrown upon the w^ant of co-operation on 
the part of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to 
do with; it is the result of the campaign with which 
we are concerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards 
was certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was 
one of the fair chances of war, and it was a fault in 
which Wellington, made wise by experience, was 
never again detected. 

When the news of the untoward result of this 
campaign reached England, the clamour against the 
government and against Wellington was quite as 



14 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

violent as that excited by the disasters of Sir John 
Moore's army. The opposition in Parliament took 
advantage of this feeling to rouse public opinion to 
such a manifestation as might compel the termina- 
tion of the war in the Peninsula and drive the minis- 
try from office. The Common Council of London, 
probably a fair exponent of the opinions of the middle 
class, petitioned the King not to confirm the grant 
of £2000 a year, which the Ministry had succeeded 
in getting Parliament to vote to AVellington. The 
petitioners ridiculed the idea that a battle attended 
with such results should be called a victory. "It 
should rather be called a calamity,^'' they said, " since 
we were obliged to seek safety in a precipitate flight, 
abandoning many thousands of our wounded country- 
men into the hands of the French." In the opinion 
of the strategists in the Common Council and of 
their friends in Parliament, Wellington might be a 
brave officer, but he was no general ; he had neglected 
the protection of his flanks and his line of communi- 
cation. When it is remembered, that at this very 
time, Wellington, profiting by the experience of the 
past, was diligently making his army really efl"ective 
within the lines of Torres Vedras, from which strong- 
hold it was in due time to sally forth like a giant 
refreshed, never to rest until it had planted the Eng- 
lish flag on the heights of Toulouse, we may perhaps 
smile at the presumption of those who, sincere well- 
wishers to the cause, displayed only their ignorance 



■ CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 15 

in their criticism. But what shall be said of thos^ 
who, knowing better, being quite able to understand 
the wisdom of the policy adopted by the General to 
insure success in the stupendous enterprise in which 
the country was engaged, yet with a factious spirit 
and with the sole object of getting into power them- 
selves, took advantage of the excitement of the igno- 
rant multitude to paralyze the energies of the govern- 
ment'? 

That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to be the 
sad but invariable attendant upon all political dis- 
cussions in a free government, corrupting the very 
sources of public life, breeding only the base spirit 
of faction, had taken complete possession of the oppo- 
sition, and in its sordid calculations, the dishonour 
of the country, or the danger of the army, was as 
nothing provided the office, the power, and the patron- 
age of the government were secured in their hands. 
It mattered little to them, provided they could drive 
the ministry from office, whether its downfall was 
brought about by blunders in Spain, or by the King's 
obstinacy about Catholic Emancipation, or by an 
obscure quarrel about the influence of the Lords of 
the bed-chamber. The sincerity of these declama- 
tions of the opposition was curiously enough put to 
the test some time afterwards, when the ministry, 
wearied by the factious demagogueism with which 
all their measures were assailed, and understanding 
perfectly their significance, boldly challenged their 



16 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

opponents, if they were in earnest, to make a definite 
motion in the House of Commons, that Portugal 
should be abandoned to its fate. This move com- 
pletely unmasked their game, and for a time silenced 
the clamour, for it was perfectly understood on all 
hands, that deep in the popular heart, undisturbed by 
the storms which swept over its surface, there was a 
thorough and abiding conviction of the absolute ne- 
cessity of resisting the progress of Napoleon's arms, 
and that the real safety of England herself required 
that that resistance should then be made iii Spain. 
Still this noisy clamour did immense mischief; it 
weakened the government, it prolonged the strife, it 
alarmed the timid, it discouraged the true, and it so 
far imposed upon Napoleon himself, that thinking that 
in these angry invectives against the government he 
found the real exponent of English sentiment, he 
concluded, not unnaturally, that the people were 
tired and disgusted with the war, and that the priva- 
tions which it occasioned were like a cancer, slowly 
but surely eating out the sources of national life. 

In the midst of these violent tumults at home, 
Wellington was silently preparing for his great work 
within the lines of Torres Vedras. It would not be 
easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was sur- 
rounded. He was fully aware of the outcry which 
had been raised against him; he knew that from a 
Cabinet so weakened by internal dissensions as to be 
on the verge of overthrow from the vigorous assaults of 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 17 

the opposition, and from its own unpopularity occa- 
sioned by the failure of the Walcheren expedition, 
and the disasters in the Peninsula, he could expect 
no thorough and reliable support. Indeed the gov- 
ernment, almost in despair, threw the whole respon- 
sibility for the military measures on the Continent on 
him alone. He accepted the responsibility in a most 
magnanimous spirit. " I conceive," he writes, " that 
the honour and the interests of the country require 
that we should hold our position here as long as pos- 
sible, and please God, I will maintain it as long as I 
can. I will neither endeavour to shift from my own 
shoidders on those of the ministers the responsibility 
for the failure, by caUing for means which I know 
they cannot give, and which perhaps would not add 
materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor 
will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and 
who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an 
excuse for withdrawing the army from a position 
which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the 
country require they should maintain as long as pos- 
sible." Animated by this heroic sense of duty, the 
Commander-in-Chief prepared to contend against 
the 200,000 men under Massena, whom Napoleon 
had sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to oppose 
this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, and 
about the same number of Portuguese tolerably or- 
ganized. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedras, 
he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and 
2 



18 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

the utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position 
forced upon Massena the necessity of retreating. 
Then instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of 
almost daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of 
Portugal, and reached once more the Spanish fron- 
tier in May 1811, nearly three years after the Eng- 
lish had sent an army to the assistance of the Penin- 
sula. Here he rested for a long time, making prepa- 
rations for the siege of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, 
operations requiring time, and the success of which 
was essential to the safety of the army in its further 
progress. Still, so little was Wellington's position, 
military and political, understood in England even at 
that time, after all the proofs he had given of com- 
summate ability, that public clamour was again 
roused against the mode adopted by him for conduct- 
ing the war. As there were no disasters at which to 
grumble, people talked of "barren victories," be- 
cause like those of Crecy and Azincourt, they brought 
no territorial acquisitions, forgetting then what they 
have never been weary of boastingly proclaiming 
since, that these victories were the best proofs that 
their army was distinguished by the highest military 
qualities, which, properly directed and supported, 
were capable of achieving the most glorious results. 
So profound was the conviction of the immense supe- 
riority of the French, both in numbers, and in the 
quality of their troops, that the public mind was in a 
state of feverish anxiety, and many of the stoutest 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 19 

hearts gave way to despair. About this period Sir 
Walter Scott writes to Mr. Ellis: "These cursed, 
double cursed news (from Spain) have sunk my 
spirits so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a 
Providence ; God forgive me, but I think some evil 
demon has been permitted in the shape of this tyran- 
nical monster, whom God has sent on the nations 
visited in his anger. The spring-tide may, for aught 
I know, break upon us in the next session of Parlia- 
ment. There is an evil fate upon us in all we do at 
home or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writing 
to Gentz, at Vienna: "I believe, like you, in a resur- 
rection, because I believe in the immortality of civi- 
lization, but when, and by whom, and in what form, 
are questions which I have not the sagacity to 
answer, and on which it would be boldness to hazard 
a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a. black 
series of ages may be prepared for our posterity, 
before the dawn that opens the more perfect day. 
Who can tell how long that fearful night may be 
before the dawn of a brighter morrow] The race of 
man may reach the promised land; but there is no 
assurance that the present generation will not perish 
in the wilderness." As if to render the situation 
more gloomy, if possible, the Marquis of Wellesley, 
the brother of Wellington, left the ministry upon 
the avowed ground that the government would not 
support the war with sufficient vigour. History has 
stripped his conduct of any such worthy motive, and 



20 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

shown that the real trouble was his anxiety to sup- 
plant Mr. Perceval. At the same time, the attack 
was kept up in the opposite quarter. "jSTo man in 
his senses," said Sir Francis Burdett, " could enter- 
tain a hope of the final success of our arms in the 
Peninsula. Our laurels were great, but barren, and 
our victories in their effects mere defeats." Mr. 
Whitbread, too, as usual, was not behindhand with 
his prophecies. "He saw no reason," he said, "to 
alter his views respecting peace ; war must otherwise 
terminate in the subjugation of either of the con- 
tending powers. , They were both great; but this 
was a country of factitious greatness. ^France was a 
country of natural greatness." So, General Tarleton 
"had the doctrine of Mr. Fox in his favour, who 
wished for the pencil of a Cervantes to be able to 
ridicule those who desired to enter upon a conti- 
nental war."* 



* The following description of the opposition of that day, taken from the 
Annual Register for 1812, bears so striking a likeness to the peculiarities 
of the leaders of an insigoificant, but restless faction among us, that, 
omitting the old fashioned drapery of the proper names, they seem to 
have sat for the photograph. "It may be remarked as a most singular 
circumstance, that those persons in this country who profess to have the 
greatest abhorrence of ministerial tyranny and oppression, look with the 
utmost coolness on the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte. The regular 
opposition do not mention it with that abhorrence which might be expected 
from them ; but the leaders of the popular party in Parliament go further. 
They are almost always ready to find an excuse for the conduct of Bona- 
parte. The most violent and unjustifiable acts of his tyranny raise but 
feeble indignation in their minds, while the most trifling act of ministerial 
oppression is inveighed against with the utmost bitterness. Eeady and 
unsuspecting ciedence is given to every account of Bonaparte's success; 
while the accounts of the success of his opponents are received with cold- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 21 

Thus, from universal enthusiasm in favour of the 
Spanish war, public opinion, at first manifesting 
itself through the factious spirit of the opposition, 
at length spoke through all its organs, in tones of 
despondency and despair, of the situation and pros- 
pects of the country, and simply because there had 
not been that sort of military success which it could 
understand, to sustain and direct it. Universal dis- 
trust seized upon the public mind ; and had it not 
been for the heroic constancy of that great com- 
mander, whose task in supporting the ministry at 
home was at least as difficult as that of beating the 
French in Spain, the glory of England had sunk for 
ever. 

Yet it happened, as it so often happens in the 
order of Divine Providence, in the moral as in the 
physical world, that the night was darkest just before 
dawn. Amidst all this universal despondency and 
sinister foreboding, events were preparing which in 
a few short months changed the whole face of 
Europe, and forced back that torrent of revolution- 
ary success which had spread over the whole con- 
tinent, until it overwhelmed the country where 
it had its source in complete ruin. The discus- 
sions in Parliament to which we have referred, took 



ness and distrust. Were it not for these things, the conduct of Mr. Whit- 
bread and his friends would be hailed with more satisfaction, and inspire 
more confidence with the real lovers of their country; for they deserve 
ample credit for the undaunted and unwearied firmness with which they 
have set themselves against abuses and against every instance of oppres- 
sion." 



22 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

place in February, 1812. With the siege of 
Ciudad Kodrigo on the 18th of January of that 
year, with the fall of Badajoz on the 26th of March, 
the first battle of Salamanca on the 20th of July, 
and Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June in the 
same year, began the downfall of the French 
Empire. 

Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 
1812, more than four years later than he ought to 
have done, according to the strategists of Parliament 
and the Press. This was all forgotten at the moment, 
so magic a wand is held by success. The fickle 
voice of popular applause was again heard, echoing 
the spirit of confidence which his persistent and 
undaunted conduct had revived in the hearts of his 
countrymen. His career of victory, however, was 
destined not to be unchecked; and when, after his 
occupation of Madrid, his unsuccessful assault upon 
the Castle of Burgos rendered a retreat to the Por- 
tuguese frontier and the evacuation of the capital a 
proper military movement, although that retreat was 
compensated for by the abandonment of Andalusia 
by the French, in order to concentrate their whole 
force against him, still the blind multitude could 
not be made to understand it, and began again to 
murmur. 

It is not now difiicult to see that the victory at 
Salamanca was really what the far-seeing sagacity of 
Marshal Soult predicted at the time it would become, 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 23 

"a prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot 
on which at that time hinged the destinies of Eng- 
land, one of those battles of which we see perhaps a 
dozen only in the whole course of history, which are 
really decisive of the fate of empires. It completely 
unloosed the French power in the Peninsula, and 
prepared the way for the great success of Vittoria, 
the next year, which gave the coup de grace to the 
French military occupation of Spain. It is not our 
present purpose to trace the history of the next 
campaign, but it is curious to observe the effects 
produced by assured success upon that public opinion 
which had shifted so often and so strangely during 
the progress of this eventful struggle. The opposi- 
tion, as their only hope of escape from political 
annihilation, and thinking to swim with the popular 
current, abused the ministers for not supporting 
Wellington with sufficient earnestness, complaining 
that they had taken the advice which they themselves 
had so often and so eloquently tendered. But it was 
of no avail. This wretched charlatanism was too 
transparent to impose upon any one; and of the great 
party who opposed the war, no one ever after rose to 
office or power in England. It required a whole 
generation, in the opinion of the English constituen- 
cies, to expiate the faults of those who had sneered 
at the great Duke, and had called the glorious fields 
of Vimeiro, Busaco, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciu- 
dad Hodrigo, and Badajoz, names which had become 



24 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

associated with the proudest recollections of English 
renown, " mere barren victories, equal in their effects 
to defeats." 

We pass now to the consideration of another class 
of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every 
war, and generally of far greater magnitude than any 
other, — those connected with the raising of the vast 
sums of money required for the support of military 
operations. In this important matter, if we mistake 
not, there are some striking points of resemblance 
between the English experience during the war, and 
our present situation. It is the fashion among many 
who seek to excite the public alarm on this subject 
from unworthy, and sometimes, it may be feared, 
from treasonable motives, to represent the enormous 
outlay of the nation's wealth which is poured out to 
save the nation's life, as wholly unparalleled in his- 
tory. Yet it may be asserted, without any fear of 
contradiction, that England, with a population then 
little more than half of that which now inhabits our 
loyal States, with resources infinitely less in propor- 
tion at that time than our own, her manufacturing 
industry, so far as external outlet was concerned, 
wholly crippled by the operation of the French con- 
tinental system, and her own Orders in Council, 
expended, during every year of the Peninsular war, 
as large a sum as has been required here each year 
to create and keep up the gigantic force now in 
arms to put down the Eebellion. During the five 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 25 

years that the war lasted, her average annual expen- 
diture exceeded ninety millions of pounds sterling, 
or four hundred and fifty millions of dollars, which 
is about the same sum which is demanded of us. No 
one, of course, pretends to say that this rate of ex- 
penditure is not appalling, yet it concerns us to know 
that it is not unprecedented, and that these vast 
amounts have been raised from national resources far 
inferior to our own. It should not be forgotten, 
also, that they represent the money price of Eng- 
land's independence, and if ours is secured by a far 
greater outlay, we certainly are not disposed to quar- 
rel with the wisdom of the investment. 

The question is, how were these immense sums 
raised in England ] The man who would have pre- 
dicted, at the commencement of the war with France, 
that the English national debt would at its close 
exceed one thousand millions of pounds sterling, and 
that the country would be able to bear such a burden, 
would have been regarded as a visionary as wild 
as he who in this country, two years ago, might have 
foretold the present amount of our national debt, and 
have contended that, in spite of it, the public credit 
would remain unimpaired. The difficulty in England 
of raising these vast sums was tenfold greater than it 
is here. Napoleon, looking upon England as the 
Southern people have been taught to regard us, as a 
purely commercial nation, undoubtedly placed more 
reliance for ultimate success upon the instinct of 



26 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

money getting, whicli would shrink from, the pecu- 
niary sacrifices necessary in a prolonged struggle, 
than upon the mere victories of his army. Hence 
he pursued, during his whole career, an inflexible 
purpose of ruining English commerce, and by a 
series of measures known as the Continental system, 
endeavoured to exclude English ships and English 
products from the markets of the world. The effect 
of these measures, although not so serious as he 
wished and had anticipated, nevertheless crippled 
enormously the resources of England just at the 
period when they were most needed. 

Taking the three years before the issuing of the 
Orders in Council and the vigorous enforcement of 
the Continental system, which were coincident in 
point of time with the commencement of the Spanish 
war, the average annual exports sank from fifty- 
seven millions to twenty-three millions, taking the 
average of three years after they had been in 
operation. Taxes were laid on at a most burden- 
some rate. The income tax was ten per cent, 
and besides, specific war taxes amounting to more 
than twenty millions a year were imposed. Not- 
withstanding all these taxes, the debt increased more 
than one thousand millions of dollars during the Pe- 
ninsular war. Discontent and violence among the 
labouring classes became universal, and it was re- 
marked that the achievement of the greatest victories 
in Spain was celebrated in England "amidst a popu- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 27 

lation who had been prevented by the burden of tax- 
ation on the absolute necessaries of life, from secur- 
ing a livelihood by the strictest industry, and thus 
pauperism had been generated throughout the land, 
a pauperism aggravated by a spirit of pillage, which 
it required a strong military force to repress." Bank- 
ruptcy and ruin fell upon the trading classes, and 
absolute exhaustion of the resources of the country 
seemed almost reached. The public stocks had sunk 
to such a degree that the three per cents., which are 
now always above 90 per cent., were rarely higher 
during the war than 65 per cent., and so depressed 
at last had the public credit become, that the last 
loan of the Continental war, that of April, 1815, 
was taken by the contractor at 53 per cent., and 
paid for in the depreciated paper of the day ; and yet 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer was congratulated 
even by the opposition for having made " a good ope- 
ration." The Bank was in a state of chronic sus- 
pension, the buying and selling of gold were prohib- 
ited to the public under severe penalties, and yet 
every gold guinea which was sent by the govern- 
ment to the army in Spain (and nothing else would 
answer the purpose of money in that country) cost 
thirty per cent, premium. How England survived 
all this complication of troubles is one of the marvels 
of history, but it is not our purpose to discuss that 
question. The great fact that the money required 
was somehow raised is all that we have to do with at 



28 HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 

present. When we have been at war for twenty- 
years, and are forced, in order to raise the means of 
carrying it on, to submit to one tithe of the sacrifices 
which were endured by the English, we may then 
perhaps begin seriously to consider the money value 
of the Union. 

The lesson which this review of the progress of 
the Peninsular war teaches, is, it seems to us, 
one of hope and encouragement, for if it shows 
anything, it proves clearly that in the support of 
public opinion, and in the means requisite to main- 
tain a great army, those fundamental essentials of 
real military success, our Government is immeasure- 
ably stronger than the English ever was at any period 
of the war. It teaches also another important les- 
son, and that is, that there is such a thing as public 
opinion falsely so called, which is noisy just in pro- 
portion as its real influence is narrow and restricted. 
One of the most difficult and delicate tasks of the 
statesman is to distinguish the true from this false 
opinion, the factious demagogue from the grumbling 
but sincere patriot, and to recognise with a ready 
instinct the voice which comes from the depths of 
the great heart of the people, in warning it may be 
sometimes, in encouragement often, but always echo- 
ing its abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the 
good cause. 

"We have confined ourselves in our illustrations 
to the discussion of questions as they aff'ected the 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 29 

success of purely military operations, because we feel 
that here our grand business is to clear away the 
obstacles, real or fancied, which may in any way 
impair our military efficiency. In military success 
alone, we are firmly convinced, is to be found the 
true solution of our whole difficulty, the only force 
which can give vitality or permanence to any theory 
of settlement. As the matter now stands, it is idle 
to hope for either peace or safety until this question 
of military superiority is unmistakably and definitively 
settled. Upon this point then, the increase of our 
military efficiency, which embraces not merely the 
improvement of the condition of the army, but also, 
as we have endeavoured to show by English exam- 
ples, and in a greater degree than is often supposed, 
the support of the Government in its general policy 
of conducting the war, should the efforts of all those 
who influence public opinion be concentrated. 

There is a certain class of men among us, not very 
numerous, perhaps, but still, owing to their position 
and culture, of considerable influence, who, accus- 
tomed to find in the European armies their standard 
of military efficiency, are disposed to doubt whether 
a force, composed as ours is of totally different mate- 
rials, can accomplish great results. We may admit 
at once the superiority of foreign military organiza- 
tion, the result of the traditions of centuries of mili- 
tary experience, digested into a thorough system, 
and carried out by long trained officers perfectly 



30 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

versed in the details of the service. Much incon- 
venience has necessarily resulted in our case from 
the ignorance of Regimental Officers, to a greater 
degree probably, however, from a want of proper care 
and attention on their part to the troops when in 
camp, than from any gross incompetency or miscon- 
duct on the field of battle. Instances of such mis- 
conduct there have undoubtedly been, but, consider- 
ing the number of the officers and their want of 
experience, those instances are extremely rare, and 
when we call to mind the number of officers who 
have fallen, while leading their men in battle, out of 
proportion, as it undoubtedly is, with the losses in 
other wars, we may well palliate deficiences in this 
respect, out of considerations for their heroic gal- 
lantry and devotion. We do not underrate certainly 
the value of good officers, but history tells us that 
great victories have been achieved by armies who 
were no better led than ours. The incompetency of 
his officers was one of Wellington's standing com- 
plaints in Spain. Most of them knew absolutely 
nothing beyond the mere routine of garrison duty; 
they were all what is technically called "gentlemen," 
for each one had purchased his commission at a high 
price, but they had had no systematic training in 
military schools; nearly all of them had had no ac- 
tual experience of war, and their average intelligence 
was undoubtedly below that of the men who hold 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 31 

similar positions in our army.* All accounts agree 
that at that period the scientific branches of the 
great art of war were almost wholly neglected in the 
British army, and such was the happy ignorance of 
the elements of strategy, that at a court-martial com- 
posed of general officers for the trial of General 
Whitelock in 1808, for his failure at Buenos Ayres, 
it was necessary to explain to the court what was 
meant in military phrase by the "right bank" of a 
river. 

It is said again, by those who have the standard 
of foreign armies always before their eyes, that among 
our soldiers there is not a proper deference to rank, 
too much camaraderie in short, and that this is fatal 
to discipline. But it should be remembered that 
mere formal discipline may be one thing, and the true 
spirit of discipline another, and yet both may answer 
the same purpose. The first may be more showy 
than the latter, but not more valuable to real mili- 
tary efficiency. Everything depends upon the cha- 

* We have no room to enumerate in detail the complaints made by the 
Duke of the oflBcers of his army. Those who are interested in the subject 
may consult Col. Gurwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346, 352, 363, 385, 
399, and 407. The "whole story is summed up, however, in the general 
order occasioned by the disorderly retreat from Burgos, in which the Duke 
said "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater 
degree than he had ever witnessed, or ever read of in any army, and this, 
without any disaster, or any unusual privation or hardship, that the offi- 
cers had from the first lost all command over their men, and that the true 
cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be found in the habitual 
neglect of duty by the Regimental Officers." This is the army of which the 
Duke said later, that "with it, he could go anywhere and do anything," 
and, good or bad, it saved Europe — in the English sense. 



32 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

racter of the soldier who is to be governed by it. 
The British army is composed, as we all know, of 
the refuse of the population, and in the war in the 
Peninsula it was largely reinforced by the introduc- 
tion into its ranks of convicts taken from the hulks, 
who were there expiating infamous offences. With 
such men, motives based on a sense of duty were 
powerless. Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a muti- 
nous spirit under privations, and a fierce thirst of 
license which defied all control in the hour of vic- 
tory, these were the brutal passions which could only 
be checked by the equally brute hand of force. But 
from such a vile herd, made useful only as a slave is 
made useful, by fear of the lash, to the civilized, 
sober, well educated American citizen, animated 
with the consciousness that he is fighting for a great 
cause, in the success of which he and his children 
have a deep personal interest, and who learns obe- 
dience because both his common sense and his sense 
of duty recognise its necessity, how immeasurable is 
the distance! The American volunteer, in this re- 
spect, has not had justice done to his excellence. 
He is certainly a soldier essentially stii generis, and 
when we hear sneers at his want of discipline, let us 
remember that although he may not regard his offi- 
cers as superior beings, yet experience has already 
shown that in the cheerful performance of his new 
duties under privations; in his freedom from those 
vices which in many minds are inseparably asso- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 33 

ciated with the very idea of a soldier; in his cour- 
age, endurance, and steadiness in battle; and, more 
than all, in those higher qualities which are the 
fruit of his education, general intelligence, and love 
of country, he presents himself to us as a figure 
hitherto wholly unknown in military history. 

One of the most cruel statements which party 
rancour has circulated in regard to the condition of 
the army is, that the rate of sickness and mortality is 
excessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the 
Government. Fortunately we have the means of 
showing that these statements are false. From 
June 1, 1861, to March 1, 1862 — nine months — the 
annual rate of mortality for the whole army is ascer- 
tained to be 53 in a thousand, and the sickness rate 
104 in a thousand. The returns for the summer 
campaigns are not yet printed, but it will appear 
from them, that in the army of the Potomac on the 
10th of June, after the battle of Fair Oaks, and 
while the army was encamped on the Chickahominy, 
the whole number of sick, present and absent, com- 
pared with the whole force of that army present and 
absent, was 128 in a thousand. During the stay of 
the army on the Peninsula it lost less than 14,000 
men by death from disease and wounds, and the an- 
nual sickness rate during the campaign was about 
that which has for some time prevailed in the 
whole army, less than ten per cent, of the whole 
force. It appears, strange to say, that the army was 
3 



34 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

more healthy when in the trenches before Yorktown, 
than at any other period of the campaign. Com- 
pare this with the English experience. We have 
already said that Wellington lost about one-third of 
his whole army from malarious fever on his retreat 
from Talavera: on the 1st of October, 1811, the An- 
glo-Portuguese army had 56,000 men fit for duty, 
and 23,000 sick in hospitals; and in the Crimea, 
while the annual rate of mortality for the whole war 
was 232 in a thousand, the period of active opera- 
tions, the last three months of 1854 and the first 
three months of 1855, shows the fearful rate of 711 
deaths in every thousand men. 

It cannot be doubted that to many the most unfa- 
vourable symptom of our present condition is the 
slow progress of our arms. This slowness is more 
apparent than real, for the history of modern warfare 
scarcely shows an instance in which so great real 
progress has been made in the same space of time, 
and it is manifest that whenever our northern sol- 
diers have had a chance of fighting the enemy on 
anything like equal terms, they have fully main- 
tained their superiority. It is none the less true, 
however, that public expectation in this matter has 
been much disappointed, and it is curious to look at 
some of the explanations given for it. The Prince 
de Joinville, in his recent pamphlet, speaking of the 
battle of Fair Oaks, and of the neglect to throw 
bridges over the Chickahominy at the proper time, 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 35 

by means of which the whole rebel army might have 
been .taken in flank, and probably destroyed, ascribes 
the neglect on one page to what he calls la lenteur 
Americaine, which he seems to think always leads 
our countrymen to let the chance slip of doing the 
right thing at the right time, and again on the next 
to ^^faiite d^ organisation, f ante de hierarchies f ante de 
lien^ qui en result e entre Vdme du chef et Varmee, lien 
puissant qui permet a un Ge^ieral de demander a ses 
soldats et d'en ohtenir aveuglement ces efforts eoctra- 
ordinaires qui gagnent les battailles.^' In other 
words, General McClellan, knowing that he could 
gain a decisive victory by laying down half a dozen 
bridges, which, it is stated, were all ready for the 
purpose, actually refused to order his soldiers to 
do it, because he was afraid they would not obey his 
orders. And this is the Prince's judgment of an 
army, which, a few weeks later, according to his 
own account, fought five battles in as many days, 
all, with one exception, victories, over an enemy at 
least double its numbers, and arrived at its new base 
on the James River in excellent condition, and with- 
out the slightest taint of demoralization. This illus- 
tration shows the absurdity of ascribing the want of 
immediate success to la lenteur Americaine, a quality, 
by the way, which we learn for the first time, is one 
of our national characteristics. 

Among the many causes which might be named, 
all perfectly legitimate, and presenting no obstacle 



36 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

which a little experience will not remove, we ven- 
ture to suggest but one, and that is the character of 
the early military education of our higher officers. 
The system pursued at West Point, although admir- 
able for qualifying officers for the scientific and staff 
corps of the army, seems to fail in teaching the 
young soldier, what is just now the most important 
quality he can possess for command, the character 
and capacity of volunteer soldiers. The system of 
discipline he has been taught is that which governs 
the regular army, a system modelled upon the Eng- 
lish, which is, with the exception of that in use in 
Kussia, the most brutal and demoralizing known in 
any army in Europe. No wonder, therefore, that 
when our educated soldiers are suddenly placed in 
high positions, and with great responsibilities, and 
when they discover that the sort of discipline which 
they have been taught is wholly out of place in 
securing the efficiency of a volunteer army, they 
are led to doubt whether it can ever be made effi- 
cient at all. These prejudices, however, are wearing 
away before the test of actual experience. Generals 
are gradually learning that they may confide in their 
men, even for desperate undertakings; they begin 
to see in their true light the many eminent qualities 
of the volunteer; and he, in turn, begins to under- 
stand something of that military system which 
seemed at first so irksome and meaningless to him ; 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 37 

and the advance of the army in the essentials of 
discipline has been proportionably rapid. 

There is a good deal of talk about the impossi- 
bility of conquering or subjugating the South, which 
is based upon very vague notions of w^hat conquest 
and subjugation signify. It is surprising to find 
how even intelligent men have been imposed upon 
by this favourite boast of the rebels and their sym- 
pathizers. A pretended saying of Napoleon is 
quoted, that " it is impossible to prevent any people 
determined on achieving its independence, from 
accomplishing its purpose;" and it is confidently 
asked whether any one ever heard of the subjuga- 
tion of twelve millions of people determined to be 
free. We reply, that history, ancient and modern, 
is full of instances of the only sort of conquest or 
subjugation which any sane man proposes shall be 
submitted to by the South. No one thinks it pos- 
sible or necessary, for the purpose in view, to 
occupy the whole South with garrisons, but simply 
to destroy the only support upon which its arrogant 
pretensions are based, namely, its military power. 
This gone, what becomes of all the rest ] and this 
remaining, where is there any hope of permanent 
peace and safety to us ? For what is all war, but 
an appeal to force to settle questions of national 
interest which peaceful discussion has failed to 
settle; and what is an army but only another 



38 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

argument, the ultima ratio, which, if successful in 
decisive battles, must give the law to the conquered'? 
To say nothing of instances in ancient history, 
Poland, Hungary, and Lombardy, in our day, were 
just as determined to be free as the South is, 
and quite as full of martial ardour; and certainly 
Prussia, Spain under the Bonaparte dynasty, and the 
French Empire, are all examples of nations which 
valued their independence, and had tenfold the re- 
sources for maintaining it which the South possesses ; 
yet the capture of Warsaw, the surrender of Villa- 
ges, the battles of jSTovara, of Jena, of Salamanca, 
and of Waterloo, respectively, settled as definitively 
the fate of the inhabitants of those countries, and 
their future condition, as if the terms imposed by 
the conquering army had been freely and unani- 
mously agreed upon by the representatives of the 
people in Congress assembled. And, in like manner, 
can any one doubt, looking at the present compara- 
tive resources of the two sections, that if we should 
gain two decisive battles, one in the East and the 
other in the West, which should result in the total 
disorganization of the two rebel armies, and thus 
enable us to interpose an impassable barrier between 
them, we should soon hear a voice imploring in 
unmistakable accents peace on our own terms'? It 
would not be a matter of choice, but of necessity; a 
simple question of how far the progress of exhaustion 
had been carried, and that once settled, and no rea- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 39 

sonable hope of success remaining, the war would 
not last a week longer. This is the experience of all 
nations, and our Southern rebels, notwithstanding 
their noisy boasting, do not differ in their capacity 
of resistance from the rest of mankind. "Hard 
pOunding this, gentlemen," said the Duke of Wel- 
lington to his officers, as he threw himself within 
one of the unbroken squares of his heroic infantry at 
Waterloo, '■''hut we'll see who can pound the longest;''^ 
and the ability of that infantry to "pound the long- 
est" on that day settled the fate of Europe for gene- 
rations. 

Let us bend, then, our united energies to secure, 
as much as in us lies, success in the field, and that 
success gained, we may be sure that all things will 
follow. Let us recognise with confidence as co- 
workers in this great object all, never mind what 
opinions they may entertain about the causes of the 
war and the new issues which its progress has de- 
veloped, who desire in all sincerity, no matter from 
what motive, the success of our arms. Upon such a 
basis, the wider and more catholic our faith becomes 
the better. "In essentials. Unity; in non-essentials, 
Liberty; in all things, Charity:" this should be our 
motto. The only possible hope for the South is in 
our own divisions. Let us remember that with suc- 
cess all things are possible; without it, all our hopes 
and theories vanish into thin air. With success in the 
field, we should not only disarm the rebellion, and 



40 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

rid ourselves for ever of the pestilent tribe of domes- 
tic traitors b}'^ burying them deep in that political 
oblivion which covers the Tories of the Revolution, 
and those who sneered at the gallant exploits of our 
Navy in the war of 1812, but also force public opi- 
nion abroad, whose faithlessness to the great princi- 
ples which underlie all modern civilization has been 
one of the saddest developments of this sad war, to 
exclaim at last, '■^Invidiam gloria superdsti.'' 






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